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EXPANDING THE AUTOMOBILE 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST: 
NEW YORK v. BELTON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
fourth amendment has fluctuated over the past fifty years, par-
ticularly with regard to the warrant exception of the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine. Last term, the Court decided New York 
u. Belton 1 in yet another attempt to clarify and define the 
proper scope of such a search. In Belton a plurality held that 
whenever an occupant of a car is arrested the police may search 
the entire passenger compartment and all the containers 
therein.' 
The Court's attempt to formulate "bright line rules," such 
as that announced in Belton, is consistent with recent Court at-
tempts to enunciate simple rules which can easily be applied to 
complex factual situations encountered by the police.8 The ac-
tual rule announced in Belton, however, cannot easily be recon-
ciled with prior decisions, even though the Court pronounced 
that Belton merely clarifies the existing law.· The Court has re-
interpreted prior law to conclude that Belton does not disturb 
the delicate intricacies that govern warrantless searches. 
New York v. Belton: Facts of the Case 
On April 9, 1978, Trooper Nicot, a New York State police-
man driving an unmarked car on the New York Thruway, was 
passed by another automobile traveling at an excessive rate of 
speed. Nicot gave chase and ordered the driver to pull over and 
stop. There were four men in the car, one of whom was Roger 
1. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). 
2. [d. at 2864. 
3. See United States v .. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260 (1973) (holding that the police have an automatic right to search the person of 
an arrestee in any custodial arrest). 
4. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (leading case for the search 
incident to arrest doctrine). 
473 
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Belton. Trooper Nicot approached the car, asked for the driver's 
license and car registration and discovered that none of the men 
owned the vehicle or were related to the owner. At the same 
time Trooper Nicot was inquiring into the ownership of the ve-
hicle, he smelled marijuana and noticed on the floorboard of the 
car an envelope marked "supergold," a term commonly associ-
ated with marijuana. He asked the four men to step from the 
car. He patted down each and separated them so that they were 
no longer in touching distance of each other. He entered the ve-
hicle, found that the envelope contained marijuana, told the four 
men they were under arrest and read them the Miranda warn-
ings as he searched each of them. He then reentered the car, 
searched the entire passenger compartment, and found five 
leather jackets on the back seat, one belonging to respondent 
Belton. Upon unzipping Belton's jacket he found a small 
amount of cocaine. Placing the jacket in his automobile, he 
drove the four arrestees to a nearby police station. II 
Belton challenged the seizure of the cocaine on the basis 
that the search had been conducted in violation of his fourth 
and fourteenth' amendment rights.· The New York Court of Ap-
peals agreed with Belton, holding that a "warrantless search of 
the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be up-
held as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no 
longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain 
access to the article. "'I 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: 
When a policeman has made a lawful custo-
dial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he 
may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile. 
It follows from this conclusion that the police 
may also examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment, for if 
5. 101 S. Ct. at 2861. 
6. rd. at 2862. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (quarantees "the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
...• n); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (no state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States). 
7. 101 S. Ct. at 2862 (quoting 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d 
574, 575, (1980). 
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the passenger compartment is within reach of the 
arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his 
reach.8 
475 
This Note will examine the basis for this holding, consider 
the changes in existing search incident to arrest law and the ef-
fects that it will have on other areas of the law. 
II. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The right of law enforcement officers to conduct a warrant-
less search incident to a lawful arrest was first announced, albeit 
in dictum, in the early 19OO's'& For the next twenty odd years, 
the Court wavered in its definition of the proper scope of such a 
search. tO 
In 1950, the Court in United States v. Rabinowitz ll upheld 
a thorough search of defendant's office after his arrest there.lI 
The Court reasoned: "The relevant test is not whether it is rea-
sonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was 
reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and 
circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."18 The Rabi-
nowitz decision, coupled with a previous holding in Harris v. 
United States,14 stood for the proposition that any area in con-
trol or possession of an arrestee at the time of his arrest was 
subject to a full search.16 
8. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
9. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (place and person where the ar-
rest occurs can be searched); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925) (search of 
the person and area within his control is permi88ible); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 392 (1914) (dictum) (right to search the person incident to arrest always recognized 
under English Law). 
10. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1931) (refused to allow search when 
officers had time to obtain a warrant and there was no criminal activity on premises). 
Go· Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States, 
275 U.S. 192 (1927) (person and place where the criminal activity is taking place can be 
searched). 
11. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
12. [d. at 66. 
13. [d. 
14. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). But see Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), 
which seemingly overruled Harris by requiring agents to obtain a warrant unle88 there 
are exigent circumstances. 
15. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1969). 
3
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In 1969, the Court specifically overruled Harris and Rabino-
witz in Chimel v. California. UI Chimel involved the warrantless 
search of defendant's home, incident to his arrest there.17 The 
Court noted that "no consideration relevant to the fourth 
amendment suggests any point of rational limitation, once the 
search is allowed to go beyond the area from which the person 
arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items. "18 The 
Court then enunciated standards that would limit unreasonably 
broad searches: "There is ample justification, therefore, for a 
search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immedi-
ate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructi-
ble evidence. "18 
The Chimel decision was based in part on Terry v. Ohio. to 
In Terry an officer stopped and frisked defendants upon a rea-
sonable belief that they were "casing" a store and thus were pos-
sibly armed and dangerous. 11 In upholding the search, the Court 
held that the stop and frisk was a justifiable intrusion under the 
fourth amendment. II But the Court stated· in no uncertain terms 
that "the scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justi-
fied by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
possible. "II 
The Court in Chimel stated that a similar analysis should 
govern the search incident to arrest doctrine." Thus the Court 
in Chimel held that the search of defendant's entire home for a 
past offense could not be justified without a warrant merely be-
cause he was arrested there. III The possibility of law officers en-
gaging in "timed" searches without probable cause is simply too 
great.le 
16. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). 
17. 1d. at 753-65. 
18. 1d. at 766. 
19. 1d. at 763. 
20. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
21. 1d. at 6. 
22. 1d. at 30. 
23. 1d. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967». 
24. 395 U.S. at 762. 
25. 1d. at 767. 
26.1d. 
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Finally, the Chimel Court stated that the search must be 
contemporaneous with the arrest "for these justifications [of ob-
taining destructible evidence and weapons] are absent where the 
search is remote in either time or place."1'7 
B. SEARCH OF THE PERSON DISTINGUISHED 
In 1974 the Court decided United States v. Robinson18 and 
its companion case Gustafson v. Florida,19 holding that a law 
officer may conduct a full search of the arrestee's person inci-
dent to arrest for the commission of a traffic offense. so 
In these decisions the Court went to great lengths to distin-
guish Terry-type stops from custodial arrests.S1 Custodial ar-
rests, reasoned the Court, are far more dangerous to the officer's 
safety because of the extended contact between the arrestee and 
the officer.s2 Thus, when there is an arrest, no matter what the 
circumstances, the arrestee may immediately be "searched. "S8 
As Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the plurality in Robinson, 
"[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a 
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intru-
sion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no ad-
ditional justification."s. Robinson and Gustafson did not in fact 
overrule Chimel,81 but foreclosed the possibility that an arrest 
search, at least as far as a person is concerned, will be based on 
the circumstances of each arrest.88 
In formulating its decision in Robinson, the Court stated 
that a search incident to arrest is a traditional exception to the 
27. [d. at 764 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1963)) (search of 
a car more than a week after the arrest procedure ended is not a search incident to 
arrest). 
28. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
29. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
30. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; United States v. Gustafson, 414 U.S. 
at 266. 
31. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233; United States v. Gustafson, 414 U.S. 
at 263. 
32. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
33. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. at 226. 
36. [d. 
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warrant requirement. a'l This general exception contains two dis-
tinct propositions: the search of the person, and the search of 
the area involved.aa The Court stated that "[t]he validity of the 
search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded 
as settled from its first enunciation,"at but that area searches, 
"[w]hile likewise conceded in principle, [have] been subject to 
differing interpretations as to the extent of the area which may 
be searched. "fO 
Since these cases dealt with the actual search of a person 
incident to arrest, it was an open question whether an automatic 
right to searc~ the area where an arrest occured proceeded from 
every arrest or whether the circumstances involved in the arrest 
would govern the extent of the search. The Court in Robinson 
expressed its decision to avoid confusion in areas where the po-
lice must make quick "ad hoc judgments."ft Still the question 
had not been definitively answered because the Court had taken 
care to distinguish the search of a person from that of the area 
in which the arrest takes place. 
III. BELTON 
It is with this background that the Court decided Belton. In 
Belton the Court cited Chimel as providing the basic foundation 
that a limited warrantless search of the area may be undertaken 
when there is a legal arrest.fl 
The Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the principle that lim-
its a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may be stated 
clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to 
apply in specific cases. '148 As in Robinson, the Court felt the 
need for a single straight forward rule because U[w]hen a person 
cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a re-
curring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of 




41. Id. at 235. 
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.3. The Court stated: "Our holding . . . does no more than 
determine the meaning of Chimel'. principles in this particular and problematic content. 
It in no way alters the fundamental principles establiahed in the Chimel case regarding 
the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests." ld. 
43. Id. at 2863. 
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his constitution protectional, nor can a policeman know the 
scope of his authority."" 
A. EXTENSION OF THE "IMMEDIATE REACH" DOCTRINE 
Although the plurality opinion in Belton purports to leave 
the Chimel search incident to arrest doctrine intact, it is not 
clear that the Court has done so. The searchable area as defined 
by Chimel's "immediate reach" doctrine is based on two princi-
ple concerns: (1) an arrestee presents a possible danger to the 
arresting officer and thus she and the area within her reach 
should be immediately searched for weapons;u ~2) concealed 
and destructible evidence on the arrestee and within her reach 
should be obtained before they are lost.48 
Under Chimel, the question should be: Can the arrestee 
reach into a concealed area for a weapon or destructible evi-
dence, not: Could the arrestee have reached for a weapon or de-
stroyed evidence? The test is designed to prevent certain actions 
at the time of arrest; not to legitimize searches because of specu-
lative actions that could have taken place earlier when the 
searched area was under the defendant's control.4? If the arrest-
ing officer for some reason cannot secure the arrestee or move 
her to an area the officer knows to be free of weapons or evi-
dence, the officer should be allowed to search the area where the 
arrestee is to be placed. But once an officer secures or removes 
the arrestee, the now inaccessible area should not become the 
subject of a warrantless search. 
By ignoring the reasoning underlying the Chimel decision, 
the Court in Belton has extended the Robinson "automatic 
search"48 doctrine to area searches. In Robinson the Court had 
reasoned that weapons obtainable from the person of an arrestee 
presented a danger to the arresting officer throughout the arrest 
procedure.49 This may not be the case in many vehicle searches. 
44. Id. at 2864. In reaching this conclusion the Court examined some inconsistent 
results among the circuits. Id. at 2863. 
45. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763. 
46.Id. 
47. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
7.1, at 501 (1978). See also New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
48. 414 U.S. at 235. 
49.Id. 
7
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When an arrestee no longer has access to the interior of the ve-
hicle, as was the situation in Belton,IIO there no longer exist the 
justifications relied on in Robinson for an "automatic" warrant-
less search. 
Nor does the Court in Belton give any indication of the 
length of time that will be allowed to pass before police intru-
sion, into the area from which the arrestee has been removed, 
will be termed unreasonable. III The Court in Chimel had stated 
that the justifications for a search contemporaneous with an ar-
rest cease to exist if the search is remote in either time or place 
from the arrest. III 
Belton is not the first case to misapply the search incident 
to arrest doctrine. III Some lower courts have credited the arres-
tee with extraordinary "reaching" abilities.1I4 Others have erro-
neously taken into account the mobility of the vehicle from 
which the arrestee has been removed.1I11 If the Belton decision is 
limited to car searches as the plurality suggests, then the fact 
that public arrests and automobile searches traditionally have 
been viewed a,s less intrusive invasions of privacy may help ex-
plain the holding in Belton." But, with the Court's abandon-
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2867. In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that when Trooper 
Nicot searched Belton's jacket there was no longer any present danger that either Belton 
or a confederate might gain access to the vehicle in which the jacket was located. 
51. In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the Court upheld the warrant-
less search and seizure of an arrestee's clothing 10 hours after the initial arrest. The 
Court stated that the search "was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and 
reasonable delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more 
imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immedi-
ately upon arrival at the place of detention." ld. at 805. Query whether this rationale will 
now be applied to car searches. 
52. 395 U.S. at 764. 
53. See United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding the 
search of a bag on car floorboard after arrestee was removed). See alia United States v. 
Gonz8Jes-Rodrigues, 513 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1975). 
54. See United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (arrestee would 
have needed the skill of Houdini and strength of Hercules to reach the contents of the 
briefcase) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
55. See United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 
(1971). 
56. See 101 S. Ct. at 2864 (police may, as a contemporaneous incident of a lawful 
custodial arrest, search the passenger compartment). See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 414-424 (1976) (warrant not required for public arrest. based on probable 
cause); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ("automobile exception" first 
stated). See alia Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). (Where probable cause to 
search a car exists, there is no difference between, on the one hand, seizing and holding 
8
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ment of the "immediate reach" doctrine, the justifications for 
the search cease and lesser expectations of privacy alone cannot 
justify an otherwise unreasonable search. 
The Belton decision allows officers to invade a person's car 
on the mere speculation that there will be evidence of illegal ac-
tivity within. The expansion of the search incident to arrest doc-
trine in this manner is in violation of the fourth amendment, 
which requires that warrantless searches be based on reasonable 
beliefs not speculations. 
B. CONTAINERS: CASES IN CONFLICT 
In two recent Supreme Court cases, United States v. Chad-
wick,1I7 and Arkansas v. Sanders,1I8 the Court indicated that sim-
ply because persons were arrested, containers reduced to the 
control of the arresting officers were not automatically subject to 
search.1I9 
Since the rule announced in Belton allows the police to au-
tomatically search all the containers within the interior of the 
car,80 it is necessary to examine these three cases in conjunction 
with one another. 
In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested while standing 
next to an open automobile trunk. The subjects had placed a 
double-locked footlocker, that agents believed contained mari-
juana, in the trunk.81 The agents arrested the men with the foot-
locker, transported them and the footlocker to the federal build-
ing and then searched the footlocker without a warrant.8t The 
Court, in rejecting the government's contention that the search 
could be justified as a lawful search incident to arrest, stated 
two reasons: first, because the search was not contemporaneous 
with the arrest68 (the search occured at least an hour after the 
initial seizure) and second, because the locker was no longer in 
the car before presenting the probable cause issue to magistrate and, on the other hand, 
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.). 
57. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
58. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
59. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. 
60. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
61. 433 U.S. at 4. 
62.ld. 
63. ld. at 15. 
9
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control of the arrestees.M The Court reasoned, "[o]nce law en-
forcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal prop-
erty not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee 
to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that 
the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon 
or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an 
incident of that arrest. "811 
The Court in Chadwick refused to extend the Robinson ap-
proach to containers within the arrestee's control. The Court, in 
a footnote, noted the difference: "Unlike searches of the person 
... searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate con-
trol cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy 
caused by the arrest."88 
It may be argued that the coat seized in Belton was prop-
erty immediately associated with the person and thus subject to 
a reduced expectation of privacy.8'7 But the Court in Belton re-
fused to make the distinction that different types of containers 
are subject to different levels and expectations of privacy.88 
In fact, in a case that was decided at the same time as Bel-
ton, Robbins v. California,8t the court expressly refused to ac-
cept the proposition that 4'the nature of a container may dimin-
ish the constitutional protection to which it otherwise would be 
entitled .... "'70 The Robbins Court went on to state that "[the 
fourth amendment] protects people and their effects, and it pro-
tects those effects whether they are 'personal' or 'impersonal.' '''71 
64.Id. 
65. Id; at 15. See also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1963). People v. Ro-
bles, 125 Cal. App. 3d 887, 178 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1981) recognized that article I, section 13 
of the California Constitution, 88 interpreted by the California Supreme Court, may pro-
vide greater protection than afforded by parallel provisions of the United States Consti-
tution. Therefore, "once the container is reduced to the exclusive control of law enforce-
ment, generally no exigency exists, justifying the warrantless search." ld. at 893, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 443-44. 
66. 433 U.S. at 16 n.10. 
67. W. LAFAVE, supra note 47, at § 5.5, at 355. 
68. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
69. 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (warrantieBS search and seizure of two packages contain-
ing marijuana from an arrestee's car trunk). 
70. Id. at 2845. 
71. Id. at 2846. 
10
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Thus, if the containers are not the distinguishing factor be-
tween Chadwick and Belton, then the movement of the footlock-
er from the scene must have activated the warrant requirement 
imposed by the Court in Chadwick. But certainly if this were 
the case, then what the Court is saying is a valid protectable 
interest in Chadwick can easily be circumvented by the police if 
only they act quickly and open all containers at the scene of the 
arrest.'71 
The Sanders case is also instructive on the inconsistencies 
that now exist in warrantless search law as a result of Belton. In 
Sanders, officers acting on an informant's tip that the defendant 
would be arriving at the airport with a green suitcase containing 
marijuana, placed the airport under surveillance.78 When the de-
fendant arrived; he retrieved a green suitcase from the baggage 
claim area and placed the case in the trunk of a taxi cab.'4 The 
police stopped the cab, and, without asking respondent for per-
mission or first obtaining a warrant, retrieved and searched the 
suitcase. 
Applying the rules of the automobile exception, the Court 
held that even though the police had probable cause to believe 
the suitcase contained marijuana, they could not conduct a 
search absent exigent circumstances." In Sanders the Court rea-
soned that once the suitcase was reduced to the exclusive control 
of the police, no exigent circumstances existed.,e In Belton, the 
jacket was within the trooper's control and remained so until he 
delivered the men and the jacket to the police station, but the 
Court allowed the trooper to search the jacket in the field." 
The discrepancy that now exists between the automobile 
and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant require-
ment is irreconcilable.'s In Belton and Sanders the "containers" 
72. See United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981). In Cleary, the of-
ficer's spot search of a tote bag at the scene was not thorough enough to discover all the 
evidence. Evidence recovered after a thorough warrantieBB search at the station house 
was suppressed. 
73. 442 U.s; at 755. 
74.Id. 
75. Id. at 765. 
76. Id. at 763. 
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. 
78. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 771 (1979) (Blackmun, J., diBBenting). 
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sanders envisioned the discrepency that now exists be-
tween the two doctrines. 
11
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were both under the exclusive control of the officers.79 In Sand-
ers, however, the officers had reason to believe the suitcase con-
tained evidence, yet they were not allowed to search; in Belton, 
the trooper had no idea that the jacket contained cocaine, but 
the search was allowed. 
C. CASE BY CASE ANALYSIS 
The avoidance of a case-by-case analysis involving excep-
tions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement is a rela-
tively new concept.80 The impact is that there is no longer a 
need or incentive for police to obtain search warrants. The pref-
erence for search warrants was .expressed in many of the Court's 
earlier decisions because it was felt that absent some exigent cir-
cumstances, the fourth amendment required that a neutral mag-
istrate be interposed between the citizen and the police.81 The 
Court provided an incentive for the police to obtain warrants by 
applying a subtle difference between the probable cause re-
quired in warrant and warrantless searches.1I As the Court 
stated in United States v. Ventresca, II "in a doubtful or margi-
nal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where 
without one it would fall."84 
Commentators in the past have believed that the search in-
cident to arrest doctrine is one exception that comes close to 
swallowing up the warrant requirement. III With the Court's new 
bright line rule, this is particularly true. The possibility of using 
an arrest for a minor traffic violation as a subterfuge for exten-
sive intrusion into those areas protected by the fourth amend-
ment is too great to leave the problem for another day as Robin-
79. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2860; Arkan888 v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 
755. 
80. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260 (1973). 
81. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
82. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 269 (5th ed. 
1980). 
83. 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
84. Id. at 106. 
85. L. TIPIIANY, D. McINTYRE & D. RoTENBURG, DETEcrION Oil CRIME lOS, 122 (F. 
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son8S and now Belton have done. This possibility has been the 
major criticism of the Courts new "rules."87 As the dissent in 
Belton points out, "the mere fact that law enforcement may be 
made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment. "88 
To give the officer the right to search the person of an arres-
tee and then to extend that right to search automatically the 
area around the arrestee, gives the police more power than ex-
isted during the days of the Harris-Rabinowitz rule. Even then 
the search had to be justified by the total composition of the 
case.88 The rights guaranteed under the fourth amendment only 
become meaningful if, at some point, those charged with enforc-
ing the laws are subject to check by a detached magistrate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court's departure from the sound reasoning expressed 
in Chime I points the arrest search and seizure law back in the 
direction of Harris and Rabinowitz. The Belton decision, as with 
these previous expansions of searches incident to arrest, lacks 
any justifiable basis on which to stand. The inconsistencies that 
exist with this decision and other areas of law involving warrant 
exceptions are the result of the Court's unsound reasoning in 
Belton. 
Patrick Coughlin 
86. 414 U.S. at 221 n.l. 
87. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REv. 835 
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88. 101 S. Ct. at 2869 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1977)). 
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